The year of Iran in the White House

By Osman Mirghani

Osman Mirghani

There are many indicators to suggest that this year will be the year of Iran in the White House, with all the repercussions that will have on our region. The latest indicator comes in the form of the leaks about the so-called “Iran-Syria deal”, currently being considered by the Obama administration, with the aim of moving on both fronts. This begins with reaching an understanding with Russia on Syria for the departure of al-Assad and his inner circle, being replaced by a transitional government of “moderate” Sunnis and Alawites. As for Iran, the deal is being marketed as a new initiative from Washington to engage in direct dialogue with the Iranians about their nuclear program, on the basis that the alternative would be to go down the line of tighter sanctions and a covert and cyber war whilst retaining the option for a military strike, which would become more probable over time.

Those promoting this deal see something in it for all parties concerned. America does not want to embark on direct military intervention in Syria, whilst it is wary of the presence of jihadists and radical Islamists in the battlefields against the al-Assad regime. Russia is now convinced of the impossibility of al-Assad remaining in power, but the Russians do not want to look as if they have received a new blow from the West, which they claim deceived them in Libya, and therefore the deal for al-Assad to leave and be replaced by a transitional government including Alawites and Sunnis will be an acceptable way out. As for Iran, it does not want to lose everything with the expected departure of its ally in Damascus, and the proposed deal opens the door with Washington and at the same time enables the Iranians to say that they took part in arrangements for the Syrian transitional phase.

The reality is that Obama, by launching this expected new initiative towards Iran, has returned to the same path he inaugurated in his first term four years ago, albeit with changes imposed by the different conditions in the region now, including the events in Syria and the continuation of Iran’s nuclear program despite sanctions and cyber warfare. In his early days in the White House in 2009, Obama began to send signals to Iran to engage in a “constructive dialogue”, open on all issues of dispute between the two countries. This was followed by a direct message to the “Iranian leadership” and the Iranian people to mark the Persian New Year, calling for a dialogue based on mutual respect. Then, in the middle of that year, Obama announced his administration’s willingness to engage in dialogue without preconditions to overcome decades of mistrust and tension that has prevailed in US-Iranian relations ever since the Iranian Revolution, the fall of the Shah’s regime and the hostage crisis at the US Embassy in Tehran.

Yet Obama’s initiatives faltered and failed to make a breakthrough in relations. They did not resolve the most important issue, namely Iran’s nuclear program, or other heated issues for that matter, despite talk of “limited understandings” on Afghanistan and Iraq. Events at the time also contributed to the downfall of this strategy, including the severely-repressed Green Revolution in Iran, which prompted the US administration to criticize the Iranian leadership. These criticisms increased with the lack of tangible progress on the nuclear front, and the publication of intelligence reports in Washington revealing that Iran would be in a position to cross the “tipping point” and be able to produce a nuclear weapon by 2014 or 2015 at the latest.

Obama’s strategy faced heavy criticism at home and abroad, and questions about its objectives and modest results. There were even those with the opinion that he had sent the wrong message to the Iranian leadership, encouraging them to adopt a more radical path in the region and making them work towards their expansion and interference in various directions, including fuelling conflicts and tensions. This reading may not be too far from the reality, especially with the US withdrawal from Iraq and the growing Iranian interference there with the rise of Tehran’s allies, along with the strong emergence of the Iranian-Syrian axis on the scene, and the warnings of the so-called “Shiite crescent” which several countries considered a direct threat to the regional balance. Faced with increasing internal and external pressure, and Obama’s frustration at not being able to achieve a breakthrough with Tehran via his dialogue initiatives, America’s discourse began to change and take a tougher line in the direction of strengthening sanctions against Iran and its leadership, in order to disable its nuclear program. This was an alternative that the Obama administration favored over military intervention, which was considered highly dangerous.

So why is Obama today returning to a policy that even his supporters admit did not succeed in dissuading Tehran from continuing its efforts to accelerate its nuclear program?

Perhaps, in his second term, Obama feels more liberated from the pressures faced by any president thinking of re-running for the White House, and therefore he wants to give a second and perhaps final chance to the policy of “positive dialogue”. This is in the hope that it will achieve better results than in the past, especially with the changes brought about by the Arab Spring and the sense that Iran may be on the verge of losing its most important regional ally as the Bashar al-Assad regime’s grip loosens in Syria, and what this means for its allies in Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine. But more importantly than that, the Obama administration may now feel that its options are limited because the hourglass indicates that Iran is soon going to cross the tipping point in its nuclear program. Based on intelligence estimates and reports, the economic pressures and sanctions, in addition to the cyber-attacks, may have slowed down the Iranian nuclear program but they have not stopped it, and now the Iranian leadership seem to be accelerating their nuclear pace.

There is also another factor pushing Obama to try and experiment with the policy of dialogue with Tehran one last time, namely the repercussions of the economic and financial crisis on America and the global economy as a whole. This has made Washington hesitant and even worried about the cost of entering into a new war, the possibilities of which are more distinct with the likelihood of Netanyahu’s victory in the upcoming Israeli elections. There are those who think that Obama has strengthened his stance with the nomination of John Kerry for the next US Secretary of State, and the possibility of nominating Chuck Hagel for the Ministry of Defense, both of whom have declared their support for the policy of dialogue with Tehran, but not excluding the military option as a last resort.

Whatever the way forward for the US administration, the repercussions will be great and no one in our region can ignore this.

About the Author:Osman Mirghani is Asharq Al-Awsat's Senior Editor-at-Large. 

The region caught between two guides

By Tariq Alhomayed

Our region has passed through the phase of the Shiite crescent, and likewise the Muslim Brotherhood crescent, and now we have entered the phase of the “guides”. Those who understand this best in our region now are the civil forces of both Egypt and Tunisia, through their respective experiences there, and thus we see their strong opposition to anyone seeking to hijack the path of both countries.

I listened recently to an important, informed source explaining that the danger of this new phase would become a reality if the Brotherhood’s constitution is ratified Egypt. This would mean that the Brotherhood would have successfully kidnapped the Egyptian state and its institutions, in a move that would have a huge impact on the Egyptians, the region, and the expected course of both. The Brotherhood would then seek not only to strengthen their position in Egypt and monopolize power for the next three decades, but would also seek to impose their control over the entire region through universalizing their project. The Brotherhood’s stated project talks about an Islamic caliphate, along the lines of what the Khomeinists in Iran did and are still trying to do, in terms of exporting the revolution there. Therefore the whole region would soon be orientated between a guide in Cairo and a guide in Qom, i.e. one for the Sunnis and one for the Shiites.

If the entire region were to be divided between two guides, one in Cairo and one in Qom, this would simply mean the abolition of the concept of the state. The entire Sunni community would then be subjected to the concept of the Wali al-Faqih, a concept which is strongly opposed even from within the Shia community. Then the region would enter into unprecedentedly complex religious and political conflicts, and this would also have an impact upon Muslims in Europe and Asia. Here it is important to share what I heard from another high-level source: Whenever the West used to discuss the Muslim Brotherhood’s project in the region the debate used to hinge on the Brotherhood pledging its commitment to democracy and having no qualms about allowing tourists to visit the country, even if they wore swimwear on beach resorts. Thus the West was largely preoccupied with superficial matters. Yet after the Brotherhood’s coup in Egypt the West was shocked, and this was confirmed to me by a senior European official, who said there was now huge disappointment towards what the Brotherhood has done in Egypt. Yes the West, and specifically Europe, was shocked by what the Brotherhood did in Egypt, and the biggest shock of all was the sight of Sheikh al-Qaradawi preaching in al-Azhar. Now the West understands that the Brotherhood wants to control al-Azhar, thus reducing any chances for moderation in the foreseeable future whether in Egypt or the region as a whole.

Now the West, and before them a broad spectrum of Egyptians and Tunisians, have begun to sense the danger of the coming days: In the Arab world, the political forces once deceived by the Brotherhood have realized that Egypt is following in the footsteps of Iran. In the West, some institutions have begun to sense the danger of the Brotherhood’s intellectual dominance over the region, because they, i.e. those in the West, understand that the Middle East is just around the corner from being divided between two guides, one in Cairo and one in Qom. This poses a major danger to the region, whereby religious and sectarian conflicts could erupt, and it also poses a major danger to the ideological or religious model of every country in the region, not to mention the fact that it would destroy the concept of the state first and foremost. Those who have studied the Iranian example will know exactly what awaits the region as a whole, where we will all be stuck between a guide in Cairo and a guide in Qom!

About the author:Tariq Alhomayed is the Editor-in-Chief of Asharq Al-Awsat, the youngest person to be appointed that position. Mr. Alhomayed has an acclaimed and distinguished career as a Journalist and has held many key positions in the field including; Assistant Editor-in-Chief of Asharq Al-Awsat, Managing Editor of Asharq Al-Awsat in Saudi Arabia, Head of Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper's Bureau-Jeddah, Correspondent for Al - Madina Newspaper in Washington D.C. from 1998 to Aug 2000. Mr. Alhomyed has been a guest analyst and commentator on numerous news and current affair programs including: the BBC, German TV, Al Arabiya, Al- Hurra, LBC and the acclaimed Imad Live’s four-part series on terrorism and reformation in Saudi Arabia. He is also the first Journalist to conduct an interview with Osama Bin Ladin's Mother. Mr. Alhomayed holds a BA degree in Media studies from King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, and has also completed his Introductory courses towards a Master’s degree from George Washington University in Washington D.C. He is based in London.