The region caught between two guides

By Tariq Alhomayed

Our region has passed through the phase of the Shiite crescent, and likewise the Muslim Brotherhood crescent, and now we have entered the phase of the “guides”. Those who understand this best in our region now are the civil forces of both Egypt and Tunisia, through their respective experiences there, and thus we see their strong opposition to anyone seeking to hijack the path of both countries.

I listened recently to an important, informed source explaining that the danger of this new phase would become a reality if the Brotherhood’s constitution is ratified Egypt. This would mean that the Brotherhood would have successfully kidnapped the Egyptian state and its institutions, in a move that would have a huge impact on the Egyptians, the region, and the expected course of both. The Brotherhood would then seek not only to strengthen their position in Egypt and monopolize power for the next three decades, but would also seek to impose their control over the entire region through universalizing their project. The Brotherhood’s stated project talks about an Islamic caliphate, along the lines of what the Khomeinists in Iran did and are still trying to do, in terms of exporting the revolution there. Therefore the whole region would soon be orientated between a guide in Cairo and a guide in Qom, i.e. one for the Sunnis and one for the Shiites.

If the entire region were to be divided between two guides, one in Cairo and one in Qom, this would simply mean the abolition of the concept of the state. The entire Sunni community would then be subjected to the concept of the Wali al-Faqih, a concept which is strongly opposed even from within the Shia community. Then the region would enter into unprecedentedly complex religious and political conflicts, and this would also have an impact upon Muslims in Europe and Asia. Here it is important to share what I heard from another high-level source: Whenever the West used to discuss the Muslim Brotherhood’s project in the region the debate used to hinge on the Brotherhood pledging its commitment to democracy and having no qualms about allowing tourists to visit the country, even if they wore swimwear on beach resorts. Thus the West was largely preoccupied with superficial matters. Yet after the Brotherhood’s coup in Egypt the West was shocked, and this was confirmed to me by a senior European official, who said there was now huge disappointment towards what the Brotherhood has done in Egypt. Yes the West, and specifically Europe, was shocked by what the Brotherhood did in Egypt, and the biggest shock of all was the sight of Sheikh al-Qaradawi preaching in al-Azhar. Now the West understands that the Brotherhood wants to control al-Azhar, thus reducing any chances for moderation in the foreseeable future whether in Egypt or the region as a whole.

Now the West, and before them a broad spectrum of Egyptians and Tunisians, have begun to sense the danger of the coming days: In the Arab world, the political forces once deceived by the Brotherhood have realized that Egypt is following in the footsteps of Iran. In the West, some institutions have begun to sense the danger of the Brotherhood’s intellectual dominance over the region, because they, i.e. those in the West, understand that the Middle East is just around the corner from being divided between two guides, one in Cairo and one in Qom. This poses a major danger to the region, whereby religious and sectarian conflicts could erupt, and it also poses a major danger to the ideological or religious model of every country in the region, not to mention the fact that it would destroy the concept of the state first and foremost. Those who have studied the Iranian example will know exactly what awaits the region as a whole, where we will all be stuck between a guide in Cairo and a guide in Qom!

About the author:Tariq Alhomayed is the Editor-in-Chief of Asharq Al-Awsat, the youngest person to be appointed that position. Mr. Alhomayed has an acclaimed and distinguished career as a Journalist and has held many key positions in the field including; Assistant Editor-in-Chief of Asharq Al-Awsat, Managing Editor of Asharq Al-Awsat in Saudi Arabia, Head of Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper's Bureau-Jeddah, Correspondent for Al - Madina Newspaper in Washington D.C. from 1998 to Aug 2000. Mr. Alhomyed has been a guest analyst and commentator on numerous news and current affair programs including: the BBC, German TV, Al Arabiya, Al- Hurra, LBC and the acclaimed Imad Live’s four-part series on terrorism and reformation in Saudi Arabia. He is also the first Journalist to conduct an interview with Osama Bin Ladin's Mother. Mr. Alhomayed holds a BA degree in Media studies from King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, and has also completed his Introductory courses towards a Master’s degree from George Washington University in Washington D.C. He is based in London.

Egypt: Could Mursi become another Khomeini?

By Amir Taheri

Judging by the barrage of comments triggered by President Mohamed Mursi’s controversial executive decree, Egypt has already fallen under a new dictatorship. Mursi, one commentator insists, has killed the Arab Spring. What Egypt is entering is an “Islamist Winter”, another pundit observes. Pushing hyperbole further, some commentators suggest that Mursi wants to be “another Khomeini”.

Almost daily protests at Tahrir Square leave little doubt that Mursi’s decree has touched a raw nerve. Nevertheless, it is important that any response to Mursi’s move be proportionate. To that end one should try to understand Mursi’s move, without necessarily justifying it.

On close examination, Mursi’s decree appears less frightening than we are led to believe. Because Egypt is in transition, it is not quite clear how executive decisions could be taken and validated. Mursi’s decree is an attempt at dealing with that dilemma, albeit in a rather gauche way that is open to misunderstanding.

Mursi was elected under a presidential, rather than a parliamentary, system in which the President of the Republic is both head of state and head of the executive branch of government. In such systems, the president could take and enforce a range of decisions without the prior approval of the legislative branch of government.

In the United States, for example, the president has the power to make numerous appointments, below Cabinet level, without approval from Congress.

The American president could also take numerous decisions by using a device called “presidential finding.”

When Congress is in recess, the president could even make Cabinet level appointments by decree. An example was the appointment by President George W Bush of John Bolton as US Ambassador to the United Nations. This was done because the Democrat-dominated Senate had threatened to prevent the appointment by filibustering.

Even on such highly sensitive issues as getting involved in a foreign war, the president retains immense powers for up to 90 days. In some cases, as the recent US intervention in Libya, a presidential decision could be shaped in ways that circumvent the War Powers Act.

In France, which also has a presidential system, the powers of the president are even greater. Unlike his US counterpart, a French president is not obliged to have members of his Cabinet vetted and ratified by the parliament. Nor does he offer the parliament a State of the Union report.

Needless to say in both the American and French systems virtually every presidential decision remains open to legal challenge through the Supreme Court in the United States and the Constitutional Council in France. In both countries any citizen could apply for an injunction. However, even then they cannot expect the court to pre-empt a presidential decision.

What Mursi is trying to do is to introduce a mechanism that resembles the American “presidential findings” and the French “presidential decrees”.

Regardless of the content of the decision taken or to be taken, Mursi has the right to devise a mechanism in the absence of a legislative power. This is needed to protect the decision-making process against disruption through pre-emptive attempts at securing injunctions from the Constitutional Court. To add to complications, the very status of that court remains uncertain if only because the new constitution is not yet drafted.

To be sure, Egypt should move towards the rule of law. But the rule of law does not mean rule by lawyers. One could recall many examples of how the rule of law is twisted into rule by lawyers in many walks of life. The US has witnessed at least one presidential election decided by lawyers rather than the electorate. Outside politics, we saw how a man charged with murder was cleared in a criminal court but then found guilty of exactly the same crime in a civil one.

An example of attempts by lawyers to rule without being answerable to an electorate came in Pakistan earlier this year when a coalition of judges and barristers managed to push the prime minister out in an act of political vendetta.

Mursi’s decree gives him the leeway needed to deal with issues of national security and sovereignty. However, even then, and contrary to what he may think, none of his decisions would be immune from post-factum legal challenge. There is nothing in the Egyptian Civil and Criminal Codes to prevent a citizen or group of citizens from lodging a suit at a court. Thus, Mursi will not obtain anything more than what is allowed under the well-established principle of Sovereign Immunity recognised by both Egyptian and international laws.

As always, Egyptians have shown their originality by producing a political show in which lawyers practice street politics in the name of defending institutional democracy.

Will Mursi become another Khomeini, that is to say a destructive element in Egyptian life? I doubt it. Khomeini won power through terror and violence, and never submitted himself or his associates to the test of free elections. Mursi, however, owes his position to an election organised by his political opponents. More importantly, perhaps, Mursi, like most Egyptians, is familiar with the disaster that Khomeinism has brought to Iran. No sane person would want something like that to happen to Egypt or any other country for that matter. All those who wish to prevent a new dictatorship in Egypt have the right, even the duty, to be vigilant.

However, focusing on the form of policy-making is at best futile and at worst harmful to Egyptian hopes for democracy. What is needed is to focus on the content of Mursi’s policies many of which are deeply reactionary or misguided. Opposing Mursi must not mean trying to sabotage his presidency.

About the Author: Amir Taheri was born in Ahvaz, southwest Iran, and educated in Tehran, London and Paris. He was Executive Editor-in-Chief of the daily Kayhan in Iran (1972-79). In 1980-84, he was Middle East Editor for the Sunday Times. In 1984-92, he served as member of the Executive Board of the International Press Institute (IPI). Between 1980 and 2004, he was a contributor to the International Herald Tribune. He has written for the Wall Street Journal, the New York Post, the New York Times, the London Times, the French magazine Politique Internationale, and the German weekly Focus. Between 1989 and 2005, he was editorial writer for the German daily Die Welt. Taheri has published 11 books, some of which have been translated into 20 languages. He has been a columnist for Asharq Alawsat since 1987. Taheri's latest book "The Persian Night" is published by Encounter Books in London and New York.