The Iraqi Spring and the Iranian Autumn

By Tariq Alhomayed

The leader of the Sadrist trend, Muqtada al-Sadr, warned that “the Iraqi Spring is coming” after Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki threatened to use force to disperse a protest along the international road in Anbar province ten days ago. So is the Iraqi Spring really coming? The simple answer is that the Iraqi Spring will be the Iranian Autumn.

Al-Maliki has not overcome the storm he is facing; rather it has transformed into a hurricane, and those that will fall this time are the Iranians, not the Iraqis. Tehran certainly would not be able to bear the fall of the criminal al-Assad regime and the uprooting of its ally al-Maliki in Iraq, for this would be a tough Iranian Autumn, especially with the Iranian presidential elections around the corner, not to mention other issues soon to come to a head such as the Iranian nuclear program. All this could push Iran to accelerate the fall of al-Maliki, before the fall of al-Assad, by replacing al-Maliki as Iraq’s Prime Minister with another, more acceptable figure. This is what many in Iraq must be alert to, especially some of the Sunnis there. They must distance themselves from such sectarianism and not raise pictures of Saddam Hussein in their protests. Just as al-Sadr warned them himself, and he is right, it is possible to turn the Iraqi storm into a hurricane to uproot al-Maliki, even before he uses the force he is threatening.

Al-Sadr has entered into the anti-Maliki demonstrations, and certainly the Kurds will follow, especially with al-Maliki’s continual threats towards them. Of course the Sadrists and the Kurds understand - along with other Iraqi political forces - the seriousness of what al-Maliki is doing in Iraq. These factors could all force Iran to take a step, along the lines of “jumping before you are pushed”, to replace al-Maliki with another figure capable of achieving the minimum level of Iraqi consensus, especially as al-Maliki has burned his bridges with the bulk of the Iraqi political trends. Iran, which is doing all it can today to prevent the inevitable fall of al-Assad, cannot afford the fall of another strategic ally, Iraq. This would be a difficult blow to take for the mullah’s regime in Iran, which, as noted above, has other important and decisive concerns, whether externally or internally.

The fall of al-Maliki, as threatened by al-Sadr through his claim that “the Iraqi Spring is coming”, means that Iran’s hands in the region will be cut off, and the magic would turn against the magician. Just as Iran thought there would be no Syria without al-Assad, Tehran could soon find itself without any state-level allies in the region, including Iraq and Syria.

Thus, as long as the active Iraqi parties mobilize in a coordinated manner, and with al-Maliki countering the demonstrations with force, and some of the Sunnis in Iraq realizing that the time now requires intelligence not emotion, especially when it comes to raising pictures of Saddam Hussein and other divisive acts, then we should not rule out the possibility that al-Maliki could fall at the hands of Iran, before the fall of the tyrant al-Assad. This would be in order to preserve the minimum of Iran’s interests in the region. Yet the fall of al-Maliki at the hands of the Iraqis, through the so-called “Iraqi Spring” that al-Sadr has warned of, will likely represent the Iranian Autumn, and this is what wise minds everywhere must encourage!

About the author: Tariq Alhomayed is the Editor-in-Chief of Asharq Al-Awsat, the youngest person to be appointed that position. Mr. Alhomayed has an acclaimed and distinguished career as a Journalist and has held many key positions in the field including; Assistant Editor-in-Chief of Asharq Al-Awsat, Managing Editor of Asharq Al-Awsat in Saudi Arabia, Head of Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper's Bureau-Jeddah, Correspondent for Al - Madina Newspaper in Washington D.C. from 1998 to Aug 2000. Mr. Alhomyed has been a guest analyst and commentator on numerous news and current affair programs including: the BBC, German TV, Al Arabiya, Al- Hurra, LBC and the acclaimed Imad Live’s four-part series on terrorism and reformation in Saudi Arabia. He is also the first Journalist to conduct an interview with Osama Bin Ladin's Mother. Mr. Alhomayed holds a BA degree in Media studies from King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, and has also completed his Introductory courses towards a Master’s degree from George Washington University in Washington D.C. He is based in London.

The year of Iran in the White House

By Osman Mirghani

Osman Mirghani

There are many indicators to suggest that this year will be the year of Iran in the White House, with all the repercussions that will have on our region. The latest indicator comes in the form of the leaks about the so-called “Iran-Syria deal”, currently being considered by the Obama administration, with the aim of moving on both fronts. This begins with reaching an understanding with Russia on Syria for the departure of al-Assad and his inner circle, being replaced by a transitional government of “moderate” Sunnis and Alawites. As for Iran, the deal is being marketed as a new initiative from Washington to engage in direct dialogue with the Iranians about their nuclear program, on the basis that the alternative would be to go down the line of tighter sanctions and a covert and cyber war whilst retaining the option for a military strike, which would become more probable over time.

Those promoting this deal see something in it for all parties concerned. America does not want to embark on direct military intervention in Syria, whilst it is wary of the presence of jihadists and radical Islamists in the battlefields against the al-Assad regime. Russia is now convinced of the impossibility of al-Assad remaining in power, but the Russians do not want to look as if they have received a new blow from the West, which they claim deceived them in Libya, and therefore the deal for al-Assad to leave and be replaced by a transitional government including Alawites and Sunnis will be an acceptable way out. As for Iran, it does not want to lose everything with the expected departure of its ally in Damascus, and the proposed deal opens the door with Washington and at the same time enables the Iranians to say that they took part in arrangements for the Syrian transitional phase.

The reality is that Obama, by launching this expected new initiative towards Iran, has returned to the same path he inaugurated in his first term four years ago, albeit with changes imposed by the different conditions in the region now, including the events in Syria and the continuation of Iran’s nuclear program despite sanctions and cyber warfare. In his early days in the White House in 2009, Obama began to send signals to Iran to engage in a “constructive dialogue”, open on all issues of dispute between the two countries. This was followed by a direct message to the “Iranian leadership” and the Iranian people to mark the Persian New Year, calling for a dialogue based on mutual respect. Then, in the middle of that year, Obama announced his administration’s willingness to engage in dialogue without preconditions to overcome decades of mistrust and tension that has prevailed in US-Iranian relations ever since the Iranian Revolution, the fall of the Shah’s regime and the hostage crisis at the US Embassy in Tehran.

Yet Obama’s initiatives faltered and failed to make a breakthrough in relations. They did not resolve the most important issue, namely Iran’s nuclear program, or other heated issues for that matter, despite talk of “limited understandings” on Afghanistan and Iraq. Events at the time also contributed to the downfall of this strategy, including the severely-repressed Green Revolution in Iran, which prompted the US administration to criticize the Iranian leadership. These criticisms increased with the lack of tangible progress on the nuclear front, and the publication of intelligence reports in Washington revealing that Iran would be in a position to cross the “tipping point” and be able to produce a nuclear weapon by 2014 or 2015 at the latest.

Obama’s strategy faced heavy criticism at home and abroad, and questions about its objectives and modest results. There were even those with the opinion that he had sent the wrong message to the Iranian leadership, encouraging them to adopt a more radical path in the region and making them work towards their expansion and interference in various directions, including fuelling conflicts and tensions. This reading may not be too far from the reality, especially with the US withdrawal from Iraq and the growing Iranian interference there with the rise of Tehran’s allies, along with the strong emergence of the Iranian-Syrian axis on the scene, and the warnings of the so-called “Shiite crescent” which several countries considered a direct threat to the regional balance. Faced with increasing internal and external pressure, and Obama’s frustration at not being able to achieve a breakthrough with Tehran via his dialogue initiatives, America’s discourse began to change and take a tougher line in the direction of strengthening sanctions against Iran and its leadership, in order to disable its nuclear program. This was an alternative that the Obama administration favored over military intervention, which was considered highly dangerous.

So why is Obama today returning to a policy that even his supporters admit did not succeed in dissuading Tehran from continuing its efforts to accelerate its nuclear program?

Perhaps, in his second term, Obama feels more liberated from the pressures faced by any president thinking of re-running for the White House, and therefore he wants to give a second and perhaps final chance to the policy of “positive dialogue”. This is in the hope that it will achieve better results than in the past, especially with the changes brought about by the Arab Spring and the sense that Iran may be on the verge of losing its most important regional ally as the Bashar al-Assad regime’s grip loosens in Syria, and what this means for its allies in Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine. But more importantly than that, the Obama administration may now feel that its options are limited because the hourglass indicates that Iran is soon going to cross the tipping point in its nuclear program. Based on intelligence estimates and reports, the economic pressures and sanctions, in addition to the cyber-attacks, may have slowed down the Iranian nuclear program but they have not stopped it, and now the Iranian leadership seem to be accelerating their nuclear pace.

There is also another factor pushing Obama to try and experiment with the policy of dialogue with Tehran one last time, namely the repercussions of the economic and financial crisis on America and the global economy as a whole. This has made Washington hesitant and even worried about the cost of entering into a new war, the possibilities of which are more distinct with the likelihood of Netanyahu’s victory in the upcoming Israeli elections. There are those who think that Obama has strengthened his stance with the nomination of John Kerry for the next US Secretary of State, and the possibility of nominating Chuck Hagel for the Ministry of Defense, both of whom have declared their support for the policy of dialogue with Tehran, but not excluding the military option as a last resort.

Whatever the way forward for the US administration, the repercussions will be great and no one in our region can ignore this.

About the Author:Osman Mirghani is Asharq Al-Awsat's Senior Editor-at-Large.